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ABORTION & BIRTH CONTROL-
RIGHT TO ABORTION & REGULATION THEREOF:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT INVALIDATES
A STATUTE BANNING PARTIAL BIRTH ABORTIONS
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)
I. FACTS
Dr. Leroy Carhart was a Nebraska doctor who performed abortions,
including the partial birth procedure.' Dr. Carhart performed abortions
from three weeks to viability. 2 Because no Nebraska hospitals openly
performed abortions, Dr. Carhart was the only physician in the state who
performed abortions after sixteen weeks of pregnancy. 3 After the
fifteenth week of pregnancy, Dr. Carhart attempted to perform a D&X
abortion in all abortion cases. 4 Dr. Carhart challenged a Nebraska
statute banning partial birth abortions by claiming it was unconstitutional
because it imposed an undue burden upon a woman seeking to obtain a
partial birth abortion. 5 Violation of the Nebraska law was a Class III
felony and mandated an automatic loss of the doctor's license as well as
a prison term of up to twenty years and a fine up to $25,000.6
The issue in Dr. Carhart's case was whether the Nebraska statute
banning partial birth abortions, without either a health exception for a
woman or an exception for when a particular method is safest for a
woman, imposed an undue burden on a woman seeking to obtain an
1. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000); see also NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-326(9) (Supp.
2000) (defining partial birth abortion as: "an abortion procedure in which the person performing the
abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and
completing the delivery").
2. Brief for Respondent at 14, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830).
3. Id. In 1996, Dr. Carhart performed 800 abortions, 200 of which were performed at fourteen
or more weeks of gestation. Id.
4. Id. A D&X abortion, dilation and extraction, is an intact abortion performed when the fetus
presents itself feet first in a breech presentation. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 927. The doctor pulls the fetal
body except the head through the cervix, so he can then collapse the head and remove the entire body.
Id.
5. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 929-30; see also NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(1) (Supp. 2000). The
Nebraska statute states: "No partial-birth abortion shall be performed in this state, unless such pro-
cedure is necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder,
physical illness or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising
from the pregnancy itself." Id. It further defines partial birth abortion as "an abortion procedure in
which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before
killing the unborn child and completing the delivery." Id. § 28-326(9). The term "partially delivers
vaginally" means "deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a
substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the person performing such
procedure knows will kill the unborn child and does kill the unborn child." Id.
6. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922.
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abortion, thus making it unconstitutional.7 Dr. Carhart brought his
lawsuit in federal district court seeking a declaration that the Nebraska
statute violated the Constitution and asking for an injunction forbidding
its enforcement just three days after the enactment of the statute.8
The district court entered a temporary restraining order and then
later ordered a preliminary injunction. 9 The district court held the
statute unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. 10 On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, reading the Nebraska statute as
banning both the D&X procedure as well as the D&E procedure.11 The
Eighth Circuit found the statute unconstitutional because the ban of both
partial birth abortion procedures placed an undue burden on a woman
seeking an abortion.1 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 13 The
Supreme Court found the Nebraska partial birth abortion ban unconsti-
tutional for two reasons: (1) the statute imposed an "undue burden" on
a woman's ability to choose a D&E abortion, which unduly burdened
her right to choose abortion itself, and (2) the statute lacked any excep-
tion for protection of the mother's health.14
The Supreme Court held the Nebraska partial birth abortion ban
unconstitutional because the Court read the ban to include the D&E
method of abortion, placing an undue burden in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion.15
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Hippocratic oath states, "I will give no deadly medicine to
anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will
not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion"1 6 or "I will neither
give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a sugges-
tion to this effect. Similarly, I will not give to a woman an abortive
remedy." 17 These translations of the Hippocratic oath illustrate the
moral and ethical dilemma surrounding abortion since the beginning of
7. Id. at 929-30.
8. Brief for Petitioners at 5, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830).
9. Id.
10. Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1100 (D. Neb. 1998).
11. Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 1999). The D&E procedure, dilation and
evacuation, involves dismemberment of the fetus or collapse of fetal parts to remove it from the
uterus. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 925.
12. Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150-51; see also Petitioners' Brief at 5-6, Stenberg (No. 99-830).
13. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 923.
14. Id. at 930.
15. Id. at 945-46.
16. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 131 (1973) (citing LUDWIG EDELSTIN, THE HiPPOCRATsc OATH 3
(1943)).
17. Id. (citing ARTURO CASsGouoN, A HisToRY OF MEDICINE 154 (2d ed. 1947)).
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modem medicine.18 Early common law coined the term "quickening"
which described a stage during the pregnancy after which abortion
became an indictable offense.19 Christian theology and canon law fixed
"quickening" to specific points of animation, forty days for males and
eighty days for females.2 0 Prior to these points, the fetus was regarded as
part of the mother, and abortion could not be prosecuted as homicide.21
English statutory law criminalized abortion in 1803 in Lord Ellen-
borough's Act.22 The Act made abortion of a "quick fetus" a capital
crime and made pre-quickening abortions a lesser felony. 23 The
Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861 was the basis for anti-abortion
laws until reforms in 1967.24 The Infant Life (Preservation) Act was
enacted in 1929 and focused on the destruction of the life of a child
capable of being born alive, if the willful act was performed with the
necessary intent of a felony. 25 Guilt could not be found unless it was
proven that the act was not done in good faith for the preservation of the
life of the mother. 26
Parliament enacted the Abortion Act of 1967, which permits a
physician to perform an abortion when two other licensed physicians
agree that either the pregnancy would involve a risk to the mother's life
or family that would outweigh the risks of terminating the pregnancy or
there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from
mental or physical abnormalities and be seriously handicapped. 27 In
America, up until the mid-nineteenth century, abortion was regulated by
the pre-existing English common law. 28 The first state to enact abortion
legislation adopted part of Lord Ellenborough's Act in 1821 without
imposing the death penalty. 29 Legislation began to replace common law
18. Id. at 131-32.
19. Id. at 132-33 (explaining "quickening" as the first recognizable movement in utero, usually
occurring in the sixteenth to eighteenth weeks of pregnancy).
20. Id. at 133-34 (defining animation as the point when a fetus has a soul and is recognizably
human).
21. Id. at 134. St. Augustine's writings differentiated between an embryo inanimatus, a fetus not
yet endowed with a soul, and embryo animatus, an embryo with a soul. Id. at 133 n.22. His writings
are thought to have influenced the fixation of "quickening." Id.
22. Id. at 136.
23. Id. at 135-36. This distinction between the crimes disappeared with the death penalty in
1837. Id. at 136.
24. Id. at 136-37.
25. Id. at 137.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 137-38. The law also made it legal for a physician, without the concurrence of other
physicians, to perform an abortion when immediately necessary to prevent serious injury to the
mother. Id. at 138.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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in the regulation of abortions in America around the time of the Civil
War.30
A. ROE V. WADE
These concepts were further outlined many years later when the
United States Supreme Court ignited a social and moral flame by ruling
in Roe v. Wade3l that a woman's right to abortion was partially protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 32 Jane Roe was
an unmarried pregnant woman seeking to obtain a safe clinical
abortion. 33 Texas law made all abortions illegal unless they were per-
formed "for the purpose of saving the life of the mother." 34 Roe
claimed she could not obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life
did not appear threatened and she could not afford to travel out of state
to obtain an abortion. 35
The right to privacy concerning matters of childbearing was first
recognized by the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird,36 when it recognized
"the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."37 The Court
found in Katz v. United States38 that protection of an individual's
general privacy, to be absolutely free from outside interference, was
regulated by state law. 39 The Court in Roe chose to not absolutely
protect a woman's right to privacy in her decision to obtain an abortion
because of two compelling state interests: the health of the mother and
the preservation of the potentiality of life.40 The Court found Roe's
circumstances distinctly different from those discussed in Eisenstadt.41
The Court found it reasonable and appropriate for the state to decide at
some point during a woman's pregnancy that another interest, either the
30. Id. at 139.
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell. Justices White and Rehnquist
dissented. Id. at 115.
33. Id. at 120.
34. Id. at 118.
35. Id. at 120. As of 1970, the following states had abortion laws: Arizona, Connecticut, Florida,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Id. at
176-77 n.2.
36. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
37. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
38. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51.
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
41. Id.; see also Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
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mother's health or the fetal existence, becomes significantly involved,
and the woman is no longer isolated in her privacy. 42
In Roe, the Court designed a trimester framework that recognized
the state's interest in the health of the mother and the state's interest in
the potentiality of life while outlining the extent to which a state can regu-
late abortion throughout the stages of pregnancy.43 The Court used the
substantive due process "compelling interest" test to determine when
the state's interests were "compelling" enough to justify regulation.44
In determining these "compelling" points during a woman's preg-
nancy, the Court found no need to resolve at which point life actually
begins.4 5 The Court also declined to recognize Texas' argument that the
fetus is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.46
It concluded that a fetus could be deprived of life without due process
because a fetus is not a person in the eyes of the Constitution. 47
The Court found an absence of any "compelling" interest during
the first stage of pregnancy, which extended to approximately the end of
the first trimester. 48 Thus the Court found that a physician and his or
her patient were free to determine, under appropriate medical judgment,
whether to abort the pregnancy without interference from the state. 49
The first "compelling" interest that the Court recognized was the state's
interest in the mother's health.50 The Court recognized the first tri-
mester's conclusion as the point at which the state's interest in the health
of the mother becomes "compelling." 51 Regulation of abortion by the
state after the first trimester was limited to matters related to the preserva-
tion and protection of the mother's health. 52 The second "compelling"
interest was the state's interest in the potentiality of life.53 The state's
interest in the potentiality of fetal life became "compelling" to the
Court at the point of viability, which is when the fetus can presumably
42. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159; see also Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
43. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63.
44. Id. at 155 (implying that abortion falls into the category of fundamental rights which are
generally protected from regulation absent a "compelling state interest").
45. Id. at 159.
46. Id. at 157-58.
47. Id. (finding no definition of "person" in the Constitution to encompass a fetus, because the
Fourteenth Amendment defines "citizens" as "persons born or naturalized in the United States" and
that definition does not include the unborn).
48. Id. at 163.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (recognizing that the risk of medical complications resulting from abortion during the
second trimester is increased).
52. Id. (providing examples of such matters as qualifications and licenses of abortion practition-
ers and what types of facilities can provide abortions).
53. Id.
2001] 349
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survive outside the mother's womb. 54 A state can proscribe abortion
after a fetus has reached the point of viability. 55 The Court did not make
this provision absolute because it found a required exception when
"necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." 56
Justice Rehnquist's dissent disagreed with the majority's application
of the "compelling interest" test. 57 Justice Rehnquist implied that the
rational relationship test outlined in Williamson v. Lee Optical C0.58 was
the proper standard because abortion was not a fundamental right.5 9
The rational relationship test required that a challenged law have "a
rational relation to a valid state objective." 60 Justice Rehnquist stated
that the Texas statute would satisfy the Lee Optical rational relationship
test.6 1
Justice Rehnquist questioned whether abortion was a right "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental." 62 Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868, there were at least thirty-six laws enacted by state or territorial
legislatures limiting abortion. 63 Twenty-one of those laws were still in
effect at the time of Roe.64 Justice Rehnquist stated that the Constitu-
tion's drafters did not intend to withdraw a state's ability to regulate
abortion through passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. 65
B. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA V. CASEY
Nineteen years later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,66 the Court again examined the extent to which a
state can regulate abortion. 67 Casey was instituted by a group of five
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 164.
57. Id. at 172-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
59. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483, 491 (1955). The rational relationship test was traditionally applied in the areas of social and eco-
nomic legislation. Roe, 410 U.S. at 173. The "compelling interest" test is associated with the Equal
Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The majority in Roe applied it under the Due
Process Clause, which Justice Rehnquist stated would further confuse the abortion related area of law.
Id.
60. Roe, 410 U.S. at 173.
61. Id; see also Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 491.
62. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
63. Id. at 175-76 n. 1. (listing the thirty-six jurisdictions which had laws limiting abortion).
64. Id. at 175-76.
65. Id. at 177.
66. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
67. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter delivered the joint opinion
of the Court, joined in part by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Id. at 844, 911, 922. Chief Justice
Rehnquist concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, joined by Justices White, Scalia, and
Thomas. Id. at 944. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, joined by
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abortion clinics, one physician, and a class of physicians who performed
abortions, in response to the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of
1982.68 The provisions of the Act that were challenged involved four
requirements: (1) informed consent, 69 (2) a twenty-four hour waiting
period prior to the abortion, 70 (3) informed consent for parents of
minors, 71 and (4) spousal notification. 72
The joint opinion altered the constitutional protection of a
woman's right to obtain an abortion that it initially found rooted in the
substantive component of Fourteenth Amendment due process in Roe. 73
Abortion is not an expressly recognized freedom in the Constitution, but
the joint opinion found that neither was the right to marry interracially, 74
the right to exercise control over the right to have children through
contraceptive use, 75 nor the exercise of parental control over a child's
education. 76 The joint opinion encompassed the right to obtain an
abortion in an "open door" policy, which found neither the language
of the Bill of Rights nor traditional state practices limited identification
of rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's "substantive
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and Thomas. Id. at 979.
68. Id. at 844-45; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3201-20 (2000).
69. Casey, 505 U.S. at 902-03; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205. The informed consent pro-
vision required that twenty-four hours prior to the abortion the performing physician must orally
inform the woman of the nature and risks of the procedure, the probable gestational age of the unborn
child at the time the abortion will be performed, and the medical risks associated with carrying the
child to term. Casey, 505 U.S. at 902-03; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205. The pregnant woman
must be informed by the physician or any other qualified health care provider or social worker that the
department publishes printed materials which provide information, free of charge, to abortion
alternatives. Casey, 505 U.S. at 902-03; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205. Medical assistance
benefits may be available for prenatal care and childbirth, and the unborn child's father is liable to
provide support for the child. Casey, 505 U.S. at 902-03; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205. The
woman had a choice whether to review the materials, and she had a right to view that material if she
wanted to. Casey, 505 U.S. at 902-03; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205. The final stipulation was
that the pregnant woman must certify in writing that the above information has been provided to her.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 902-03; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205.
70. Casey, 505 U.S. at 902-03; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205.
71. Casey, 505 U.S. at 904; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206.
72. Casey, 505 U.S. at 908; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3209.
73. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (finding fundamental rights encompassed by the word liberty in the
Constitution, traditionally those found in the Bill of Rights, to be protected against intrusion by the
states); see also Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart in his
concurrence stated that the "liberty" protected in Griswold v. Connecticut was rooted in the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; see also
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding a State does not have the right to forbid
a married couple to use contraceptives). Justice Stewart noted the majority's use of the substantive
component of Fourteenth Amendment due process to protect a woman's liberty to privacy in obtaining
an abortion. Roe, 410 U.S. at 168-70.
74. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (finding a state does not have the tight to forbid
interracial marriages).
75. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (finding a state does not have the right to forbid a married
couple to use contraceptives).
76. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (finding parents have a right to
send their children to a private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923) (finding
schools have the right to teach foreign languages).
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sphere of liberty." 77 The joint opinion stated that Roe could be read in
a few different ways. 78 One way to interpret Roe was as a rule followed
by later cases in which a state's interest in the protection of life does not
outweigh individual liberty claims regarding personal autonomy and
bodily integrity. 79 Another way to interpret Roe was as sui generis,
because later cases have upheld the central holding of Roe without
questioning its constitutional validity. 80
Casey reaffirmed one of Roe's holdings that after viability, the State
can regulate and even proscribe abortion to further its interest in the
potentiality of life.8 1 The joint opinion rejected Roe's rigid trimester
framework by holding that a state can regulate abortion subsequent to
viability. 82 Medical advancements in neonatal care have advanced the
point of viability that was initially recognized in Roe to a point earlier in
the pregnancy, which was one factor in the joint opinion's decision to
abandon the trimester framework. 83
The joint opinion chose not to overrule Roe because of stare decisis,
which persuaded the majority of justices to adhere to Roe's basic
holding.84 This adherence to stare decisis was justified when the joint
opinion revisited two cases it found comparable to such a divisive issue
as abortion: Lochner v. New York85 and Plessy v. Ferguson.86
77. Casey, 505 U.S. at 848.
78. Id. at 857.
79. Id. at 857; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
80. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857-58.
81. Id. at 879; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. Although Roe established that a state has an
important and legitimate interest in the potentiality of life, that interest has not been given enough
attention by the Court in later decisions. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871.
82. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-66.
83. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-66.
84. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
85. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court imposed substantive limitations on legislation
limiting economic autonomy in favor of health and welfare regulation when it found that liberty, under
the Due Process Clause, protected the "right to make a contract." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. A post-
Lochner case with significance was Adkins v. Children's Hospital of District of Columbia, which
involved a requirement that employers of adult women comply with minimum wage standards. See
generally Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). The Court found this wage requirement
to be an infringement of the constitutionally protected liberty to contract which was first recognized in
Lochner. Id. at 558. The Court abandoned this laissez-faire economic theory created by Lochner
when it overruled Adkins in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, by holding that the contractual freedom
created in Lochner and protected in Adkins had been mistakenly protected under the Constitution.
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937). The Great Depression had awakened
Americans to not only the dangers of laissez-faire economics, but to the worldwide demise of
laissez-faire economics. West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 392-99. These dangers were not quite so
obvious in times of greater economic prosperity such as when Lochner was decided in 1905. Id.; see
generally Lochner, 198 U.S. 45.
86. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The second decision the joint opinion discussed was the separate-but-
equal rule promulgated in Plessy v. Ferguson, which established that racial segregation was not a
denial of equal protection if the facilities were equal. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51. The Court admitted
fifty-eight years later in Brown v. Board of Education, that the "badge of inferiority" it had stated was
self-imposed by the black race in Plessy was instead imposed by the racial segregation that the Court
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These two cases were used by the joint opinion in Casey to illustrate
situations where it found that its prior decisions were based on facts that
had changed or had come to be understood differently.8 7 The joint
opinion found no reason to undertake the task of overruling Roe be-
cause it found that neither the factual underpinnings of its central
holding nor the joint opinion's understanding of Roe had changed. 88
The joint opinion discussed the potential cost of overruling Roe in terms
of social upheaval because men and women had relied on Roe to remedy
their reproductive dilemmas. 89 Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent argued
that public opinion should not be factored into the Court's decision of
whether or not to overrule such a "divisive" decision. 90 The Chief
Justice also pointed out that the Court had overruled, in whole or in part,
thirty-four of its own decisions in the last twenty-one years. 91
endorsed in Plessy. Id. at 551; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
87. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863-64. The majority found making the decisions to overrule Lochner and
Plessy to be the Court's constitutional duty. Id. ; see also Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53; Plessy, 163 U.S. at
551-52. The joint opinion discussed changed circumstances and assumed that because of these the
public would accept the decisions to overrule. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 863-64. But see Casey, 505
U.S. at 958. (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (challenging the court's reasoning that "its decision is ex-
empt from reconsideration under established principles of stare decisis"). However, the two opinions
the Court chose to illustrate why it adhered to stare decisis were unlike Casey because in West Coast
Hotel and Brown the Court overruled itself and in Casey the Court chose not to overrule itself. See
Casey, 505 U.S. at 863-64; see generally West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. 379; Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
88. Casey, 505 U.S. at 864. Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent disagreed. Id. at 961-62. The
Chief Justice found the Court in West Coast Hotel frankly admitted it had mistakenly found a consti-
tutional right to "freedom of contract" in Lochner. Id. at 962-63; see generally Lochner, 198 U.S. 45.
The Chief Justice also found the Court in Brown flat-out admitted it was constitutionally mistaken again
in Plessy when it found protection of racial segregation under the Equal Protection Clause. Casey, 505
U.S. at 962-63; see generally Plessy, 163 U.S. 537; Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
89. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (discussing the reliance people had placed on Roe in both eco-
nomic and social developments and how people had organized intimate relationships and career
choices around the premise that abortion will be available should contraception fail). The joint opinion
also found abortion facilitated equal participation of women in society because abortion provided them
with control over their reproductive lives. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's
assertion that reliance on reproductive control through abortion had facilitated women's social rise to
equality. Id. at 956-57. He cited other reasons, such as larger numbers of women obtaining higher
education to compete with men for jobs and society's recognition of the female ability to fulfill jobs
previously exclusively performed by men. Id.
90. See Id. at 962-63 (finding constitutional rules have no ties to public opinion nor does the doc-
trine of stare decisis rest on the support of the public). Chief Justice Rehnquist found the distinction
between cases that are intensely divisive and those that are not to be purely subjective and difficult to
distinguish. Ia at 958-59.
91. Casey, 505 U.S. at 959; see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-830 n.1 (1991) (list-
ing Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (overruling Kesler v. Dep't of Public Safety of Utah, 369
U.S. 153 (1962)); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, (1972) (overruling Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621
(1904)); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) (overruling Quaker City Cab
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928)); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (overruling Book
Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Mass., 383 U.S.
413 (1966)); N.D. Pharmacy Bd. v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973) (overruling Louis
K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928)); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (overruling
in part Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. of Fla.
v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972), and Sterrett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights Org., 409 U.S. 809
(1972)); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (overruling in effect Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961)); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976) (overruling Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. 29
(1872)); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
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The Casey joint opinion affirmed Roe's basic holding that a woman
has the right to terminate her pregnancy before viability. 92 The joint
opinion also affirmed Roe's holding that an exception for the health of
the mother must be present in state regulations seeking to prohibit
post-viability abortions. 93 The joint opinion found Roe's trimester frame-
work too rigid and rejected it for two flaws: its formulation "miscon-
ceive[d] the nature of the pregnant woman's interest; and in practice it
undervalue[d] the State's interest in potential life." 94
In examining the first flaw in the trimester approach, misconception
of the pregnant woman's interest, the joint opinion found that many
regulations, which served valid purposes and did not strike at the right of
abortion itself, could be invalidated under Roe.95 The joint opinion
found that such laws had the incidental effect of making it more difficult
or expensive to get an abortion. 96 But, the joint opinion found these
"incidental effects," which made obtaining an abortion more difficult,
not enough to invalidate the laws.97
(overruling Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976) (overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297
(1976) (overruling Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957)); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(overruling Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948)); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274 (1977) (overruling Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (overruling Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)); Dep't of Revenue of
Wash. v. Ass'n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978) (overruling Puget Sound Stevedoring
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937)); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (overruling
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, (1975)); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (overruling
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (overruling
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609
(1981) (overruling Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922)); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213 (1983) (overruling Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (overruling in part Rolston v. Mo. Fund Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390
(1887)); United States v. One Assortment of Eighty-Nine Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984) (overruling
Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886)); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985) (overruling Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)); United States v. Miller,
471 U.S. 130 (1985) (overruling in part Exparte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887)); Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327 (1986) (overruling in part Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986) (overruling in part Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)); Solorio v. United States,
483 U.S. 435 (1987) (overruling O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969)); Welch v. Tex. Dep't of
Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (overruling in part Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala.
Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964)); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (overruling Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)
(overruling in part Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)); Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794
(1989) (overruling Simpson v. Rice (decided with North Carolina v. Pearce), 395 U.S. 711 (1969));
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (overruling Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384
U.S. 35 (1966)); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (overruling Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S.
221 (1883), Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), and California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)
(overruling Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979))).
92. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
93. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872, 880 (finding a health exception assumed for pre-viability abor-
tions as well as post-viability abortions); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
94. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873; see generally Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
95. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873-74.
96. Id. at 874.
97. Id. at 874-75.
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The joint opinion replaced strict scrutiny with the "undue burden"
standard which rendered a regulation unconstitutional when it imposed
an undue burden on a woman's decision to obtain an abortion. 98 The
undue burden standard was defined as when "a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." 99 One factor in
ascertaining whether a regulation is an undue burden is whether or not it
"prevent[s] a significant number of women from obtaining an
abortion."OO Justice Scalia's dissent expressed frustration with the joint
opinion's adoption of the undue burden standard which he concluded
had no "coherent legal basis."lOl
The joint opinion found, by examining the second flaw in the
trimester approach, that in practice the state's interest in potential life was
undervalued. 102 The joint opinion also found that many pre-viability
attempts by the state to influence a woman's decision of whether or not
to obtain an abortion were being invalidated as undue burdens in direct
conflict with Roe's recognition of a state's interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life.103 The Court found that not all state regula-
tions promoting interests of the unborn were invalid.' 04 State regulations
which attempt to persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion
or regulations that attempt to protect the pregnant woman's health are
constitutional unless they place an undue burden in the woman's
path. 105
The joint opinion found constitutional the provisions of informed
consent, the twenty-four hour waiting period, and informed consent for
parents of minors because those provisions did not impose an undue
burden on a woman seeking an abortion.1 06 The joint opinion held the
spousal notification provision unconstitutional because it placed an
undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion. 107
98. See id. (finding that absent a showing that the regulation placed an undue burden on a
woman's ability to obtain an abortion, the law does not violate the liberties in the Due Process Clause).
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent argued that the appropriate test was whether the statute rationally
furthers any legitimate state interests. Id. at 974. Justice Scalia also found the rational basis test to be
the appropriate standard to test Pennsylvania's interests in regulating abortion. Id. at 981 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
99. Id. at 877.
100. Id. at 893.
101. Id. at 987 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 875-76, see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
103. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875-76 (1992); see generally Roe, 410 U.S.
113.
104. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
105. Id. at 877.
106. Id. at 887; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3201-20.
107. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
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Roe had established the trimester framework which provided that
during the first trimester the physician and patient were free to determine
whether to abort the pregnancy without interference from the state; that
regulation of abortion by the state after the first trimester was limited to
matters related to the preservation and protection of the mother's health;
and finally, that the state's interest in the potentiality of life became
"compelling" at the point of viability and at that point the state could
proscribe abortion.108 Casey rejected Roe's trimester framework and
redefined Roe's central holding to state that a woman has a right to
terminate a previability pregnancy without "undue burden."109 The
joint opinion adopted an undue burden standard which made a regula-
tion unconstitutional when it had the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking to obtain an abortion
of a nonviable fetus. 110
C. PARTIAL BIRTH ABORTION PROCEDURES
The difference between D&E and D&X partial birth abortions must
be explained before examining the Court's first reason for invalidating
the Nebraska statute."' 1 Approximately ten percent of all abortions are
performed during the pregnancy's second trimester, the period between
twelve to twenty-four weeks of pregnancy. 112 The most commonly used
procedure is "dilation and evacuation," D&E, which combined with
vacuum aspiration 1 13 accounts for ninety-five percent of abortions
performed during the second trimester.114
A D&E abortion performed during the second trimester will usually
include the following procedures: (1) dilation of the cervix, (2) removal
of at least some fetal tissue using nonvacuum instruments, and (3) the
potential need, after the fifteenth week, for instrumental dismemberment
of the fetus or the collapse of fetal parts to remove it from the uterus.11 5
A D&E abortion is performed using traction created by the opening
between the uterus and vagina to dismember the fetus by tearing off its
limbs using surgical instruments. 116
108. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870-73.
110. Id. at 877.
111. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 929-30 (2000).
112. Abortion Surveillance-United States, 1996, in CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVEN-
TION SURVEILLANCE SUMMAIES, MoR mrrv AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 41 (July 30, 1999).
113. OBSTETRICS: NORMAL & PROBLEM PREGNANCIES 1253-54 (S. Gabbe et al. eds., 3d ed. 1996).
Vacuum aspiration involves the insertion of a vacuum tube into the uterus to evacuate the contents. Id.
114. Abortion Surveillance, supra note 112, at 41.
115. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 924-25 (citing American Medical Association, Report of Board of
Trustees on Late-Term Abortion, App. 490).
116. Id. at 925-26.
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The risks involved with the D&E abortion procedure include
accidental perforation and damage to neighboring organs through the
use of instruments in the uterus, sharp fetal bone fragments passing
through the uterus, and the risk of infections from fetal tissue
accidentally left in the mother.117
Another variation of the D&E abortion procedure is "intact
D&E."118 It begins with dilation of the cervix and then the fetus is
removed from the uterus through the cervix in one pass, "intact." 119
This procedure is usually used after the sixteenth week of pregnancy.120
The "intact D&E" has two variations, depending upon the presentation
of the fetus.121 If the fetus presents itself head first, vertex presentation,
the doctor first collapses the skull and then pulls the entire fetus through
the cervix. 122 If the fetus presents itself feet first, breech presentation,
then the doctor pulls the fetal body through the cervix while leaving the
head in the cervix so he can first collapse it and then remove the entire
body.123 The breech presentation of D&E is also commonly known as a
"dilation and extraction" abortion, or D&X.124
The D&X procedure is described by the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists in the following steps: (1) dilation of
the cervix, (2) "instrumental conversion of the fetus to a footling
breech," (3) breech extraction of the body except the head, and (4)
"partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of a living fetus to effect
vaginal delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus."125
Once the fetal body except for the head is outside the mother's
body, the appropriate tool to tear open the skull so its cranial contents
can be vacuumed out is a pair of scissors, according to Dr. Martin
Haskell, a leading proponent of the D&X procedure. 126 The process of
117. Id. at 926.
118. GYNECOLOGIC, OBSTETRIC, AND RELATED SURGERY 1042-43 (David H. Nichols et al. eds.,
2000); E. STEVE LICHTENBERG ET AL., A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION 136
(1999).
119. GYNECOLOGIC, OBSTETRIC, AND RELATED SURGERY, supra note 118, at 1042-43; LICHTENBERG
ET AL., supra note 118, at 136-37.
120. GYNECOLOGIC, OBSTErRC, AND RELATED SURGERY, supra note 118, at 1042-43; LICHTENBERG
ET AL., supra note 118, at 136-37.
121. GYNECOLOGIC, OBSTETRIC, AND RELATED SURGERY, supra note 118, at 1042-43; LICHTENBERG
ET AL., supra note 118, at 136-37.
122. GYNECOLOGIC, OBSTETRIC, AND RELATED SURGERY, supra note 118, at 1042-43; LICHTENBERG
ET AL., supra note 118, at 136-37.
123. GYNECOLOGIC, OBSTETRIC, AND RELATED SURGERY, supra note 118, at 1042-43; LICHTENBERG
ET AL., supra note 118, at 136-37.
124. GYNECOLOGIC, OBSTETRIC, AND RELATED SURGERY, supra note 118, at 1042-43; LICHTENBERG
ETAL., supra note 118, at 136-37.
125. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 928 (2000) (quoting American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists Executive Board, Statement on Intact Dilation and Extraction (Jan. 12, 1997)).
126. Id. at 959-60 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing M. Haskell, DILATION AND EXTRACTION FOR
LATE SECOND TRIMESTER ABORTION (1992), in 139 Cong. Rec. 8605 (1993)).
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vacuuming out the fetal skull contents is referred to by the medical
community as "reduction procedure."1 27 The fetal skull is "reduced"
so that the head can be removed through the cervix and the entire body
remains intact. 12 8 Brain death of the fetus does not happen until the
skull is "reduced." 129 There are no reliable statistics on the number of
D&X abortions performed annually, only estimates ranging from 640 to
5,000.130 In addition to Nebraska, twenty-nine other states have laws
banning partial birth abortions.131
III. ANALYSIS
In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Supreme Court struck down a Nebraska
statute that banned partial birth abortions because it placed an undue
burden on a woman seeking to obtain a partial birth abortion. 132 Justice
Stevens wrote a concurring opinion which found no difference between
the two partial birth abortion procedures and no furtherance of a legiti-
mate interest by Nebraska banning D&X and not D&E.133 Justice
O'Connor concurred and found that the Nebraska statute could be cons-
titutional if it implemented the required health exception and tailored the
statutory language to explicitly exclude the D&E procedure from the
partial birth abortion ban.134 Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring
opinion which found no protection of the mother's life or health in the
statutory ban, but instead an attempt to prevent abortions altogether.135
127. Id. at 960.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 929 (comparing Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States,
1995-1996, 30 FAMILY PLANNIN PERSPECTIVES 263, 270 (1998) with Joint Hearing on S. 6 and H. R.
9292 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., 46 (1997)).
131. ALA. CODE § 26-22-3 (Supp. 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.050 (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 13-3603.01 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-61-203 (Michie 1997); FLA. LAWS ch. 390.0111
(2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-144 (1998); IDAHO CODE § 18-613 (Michie Supp. 2001); 720 ILL. Com'.
STAT. 513/10 (West Supp. 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-7 (Michie Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE §
707.8A (West Supp. 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6721 (Supp. 2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.765
(Michie Supp. 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.9 (West Supp. 2001); MICH. Comp. LAWS §
333.17016 (Supp. 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-73 (Supp. 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-102(e)
(1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-6 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5A-3 (Michie Supp. 2000);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.6-02 (Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17 (Anderson 1999); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 684 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.12-2 (Supp. 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4185 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-27 (Michie Supp. 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-15-209 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (Michie Supp.
2001); W. VA. CODE § 33-42-8 (2000); Wis. STAT. § 940.16 (Supp. 2000).
132. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000); see also NEa. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(1)
(Supp. 2000). Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Souter and Ginsburg. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930.
133. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 946-47 (Stevens, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 950 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 951-52 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented and stated that he believed Casey was
wrongly decided.136 Justice Scalia dissented because he disagreed with
the majority's application of the undue burden standard and expressed
that the Court should leave the abortion decision up to the individual
states. 137  Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion found differences
between D&E and D&X which justified Nebraska's ban on D&X.138
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion which determined that
Nebraska's statutory ban did not include the D&E procedure.139
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The Supreme Court declared the Nebraska partial birth abortion
ban unconstitutional for two reasons: (1) because the statute imposed an
"undue burden" on a woman's ability to choose a D&E abortion,
which unduly burdened her right to choose abortion itself and (2)
because the statute lacked any exception for protection of the mother's
health. 140
There are approximately 1,221,585 abortions performed in the
United States each year according to 1996 statistics, which is the most
recent year statistics are available. 141 About 67,000 or 5.5% of these are
performed either in or after the sixteenth week of pregnancy which is
from approximately the middle of the second trimester to the end of the
third trimester. 142
The Court found the Nebraska ban on partial birth abortions
unconstitutional because under Casey it placed "a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus," thus
qualifying as an undue burden on a woman's choice to obtain an
abortion.143 The Court interpreted the Nebraska statute to include the
D&E abortion procedure in addition to the D&X procedure which the
statute was aimed at prohibiting, and the Court held that banning both
methods was unconstitutional. 144 Nebraska conceded that if the statute
was construed to apply to both the D&X and D&E procedures, it would
constitute an "undue burden," but Nebraska contended that the statute
136. Id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 955-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 958-60 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 989 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 930; see also NEn. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(1) (Supp. 2000).
141. Abortion Surveillance, supra note 112 at 1, 5.
142. Id.
143. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 832, 877 (1992)).
144. Id. at 939.
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only applied to the D&X procedure.145 Both the district court and the
court of appeals found the statute to include the D&E procedure, so the
question of statutory interpretation was examined by the Court. 146
The Court struggled to define the term "substantial portion" of the
fetus as found in the statute. 147 Evidence from the trial court showed
that D&E often involves the physician pulling a fetal arm or leg into the
vagina before the fetus dies and dismemberment, as found in D&E, can-
not be accomplished without pulling part of the fetus into the vagina.148
The Nebraska Attorney General contended the statutory language
differentiated between the two procedures because he defined "substan-
tial portion" as "the child up to the head."149 He went further by alleg-
ing that the statute does not apply unless the abortionist introduces the
entire fetal body into the birth canal. 150 Finally, the Attorney General
argued that the statute differentiated between the overall "abortion pro-
cedure" and the "separate procedure" used to kill the unborn child.151
The Court rejected these arguments because the statutory language
did not specifically track or separate the medical differences between the
two procedures, nor did it provide an explicit exception to the ban for
the D&E procedure.152 The Court disagreed with the Nebraska Attorney
General's interpretation that the statute applied only when the entire
body was present in the birth canal. 153 The Court found the statutory
language did not differentiate why the "substantial portion" of the fetus
was being delivered into the vagina, whether for the purpose of dismem-
berment or "reduction." 154 The Court found that it did not have to
follow the Attorney General's interpretation because it generally
followed lower court interpretations of state law, and in this case, both
lower courts had rejected the Attorney General's interpretation. 155
The Court also looked to precedent, which weighed against accept-
ing the Attorney General's interpretation when that interpretation did
145. Id. at 938.
146. Id. at 938-39; see also Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1150 (8th Cir. 1999); Carhart v.
Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1128-29 (D. Neb. 1998).
147. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-326(9) (Supp. 2000); see also Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 939-43.
148. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 939.
149. Id. at 940. When statutory language explicitly defines a term, that definition becomes
controlling, even it differs from the ordinary meaning. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484-85
(1987) (finding the definition of a term excludes other meanings not stated in the statutory language).
150. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 940.
151. Id. at 943.
152. Id. at 943-44.
153. Id. at944.
154. ld.
155. Id. at 945. This statutory interpretation question surrounding the term "partial birth abor-
tion" has been addressed by ten of the lower federal courts, all of which found the term could
potentially include other abortion procedures. Id.
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not bind state courts or law enforcement. 156 If the state does not follow
its own Attorney General then the federal courts should not have to
either. 157 In this case, Nebraska law did not make the Attorney
General's interpretations binding.158 In response to the Attorney
General's final interpretive argument, the Court found that the statutory
language nowhere contained the word "separate" in reference to
procedure, which would separate the killing stage from the overall
abortion procedure.1 59
The Court invalidated the Nebraska statute because it found no
exception for the mother's health within the ban. 160 Casey reaffirmed
the health exception Roe initially required. 161 Nebraska's law applies to
both pre-viability and post-viability abortions, and because the law for
post-viability abortions requires a health exception, pre-viability abor-
tions at minimum require the same. 162 Nebraska disagreed with the
Court as to whether the health exception was required.1 63 Nebraska
contended that its partial birth abortion ban did not require a health
exception because "safe alternatives remain available." 164
The Court disagreed with Nebraska, citing a failure to demonstrate
that banning D&X without a health exception would not create signifi-
cant health risks for the mother.165 The majority recognized that the
state may not subject the woman to health risks arising from the preg-
nancy itself or risks from being forced to choose alternative abortion
procedures.166 The district court concluded that the D&X procedure
which Dr. Carhart performed was safer than the D&E procedure used at
the same stage of pregnancy. 167 Nebraska and supporting amici refuted
156. Id. at 940-41; see also State v. Coffman, 330 N.W. 2d 727, 728 (1983). Attorney General is-
sued opinions are entitled to "substantial weight" and "to be respectfully considered" but are of "no
controlling authority." Id.
157. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 941 (2000); see also Coffman, 330 N.W. 2d at 728.
158. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 941.
159. Id. at 943. The Court found the word "procedure" in the Nebraska statute to be used in
reference to the entire abortion procedure throughout the subsections prior to the one the Attorney
General referred to. Id. at 943-44; see also NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-326(9) & 328(l)-(4) (Supp.
2000).
160. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930-31.
161. Id. at 930 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992)). Casey required a
health exception "where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the
life or health of the mother." Casey, 505 U.S. at 879; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65
(1973).
162. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930; see also NEa. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(1). The Nebraska stat-
ute excepts procedures "necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a
physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury." Id.
163. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 931.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 932.
166. Id.
167. Id. The district court concluded that because the D&X procedure allows the fetus to pass
through the cervix with minimal instrumentation used, it reduces risks from damage caused by instru
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the district court's findings with eight separate arguments: (1) the D&X
procedure was rarely used, (2) it was used by only a "handful of doc-
tors," (3) D&E and labor inductions are always "safe alternative proce-
dures," (4) the ban would not increase a woman's risk of several rare
abortion complications, (5) D&X elements created special risks, 168 (6)
there were no medical studies "establishing the safety of the partial birth
abortion/D&X procedure," (7) an American Medical Association policy
statement suggested there was no situation where D&X was the "only
appropriate" abortion procedure, and (8) the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists found no situation where D&X was the
"only option" to protect the mother's life. 169
The Court responded by finding Nebraska's arguments insufficient
to bypass the health requirement for its partial birth abortion ban. 170
The majority found the first two factors, involving procedure rarity, to be
irrelevant to the constitutional question.171 The third factor was
unsupported by the district court's findings of the D&X procedure to be
"significantly safer in certain circumstances." 172 The district court
relied on opposing medical testimony to reject the fourth factor by
showing that if the ban included D&E, abortion complications would be
increased. 173 The Court refuted Nebraska's fifth argument with state-
ments from the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
amici brief which stated that D&X produced risks similar to those
presented by D&E procedures. 174 The majority agreed with Nebraska's
sixth and seventh arguments: there were no comparable safety studies
involving the D&X procedure and that, according to the American
Medical Association, there was no present situation requiring only the
D&X procedure.1 75 The Court disagreed with the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists' similar statement describing no cir-
ments, decreases operating time, blood loss, complications from bony fragments, and eliminates the
risk of infection caused by fetal tissue left behind. Id.
168. Id. at 933. Special risks created by the D&X procedure include: cervical incompetence
caused by overdilation, injury by changing the fetal presentation to breech, and dangers when using
instruments to pierce the fetal skull. Id.
169. Id. at 933-34.
170. Id. at 934.
171. Id. The Court held that the health exception served to protect women in the rare situations
where D&X procedures would be necessarily used or chosen. Id. The Court also held that there
were a few potential reasons why few doctors used the D&X procedure: the procedure's contro-
versy, rarity of late second term abortions, and potential procedural lack of utility. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 935.
174. See id. (finding that actual childbirth requires greater cervical dilation than partial birth
abortion procedures).




cumstances requiring only a D&X abortion because of contradictory
statements in its amici brief.176
Finally, in requiring a health requirement, the Court examined the
Casey phrase, "necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother." 177 The majority found
that differences in medical judgment did not remove the health require-
ment, because the disagreement signaled some sort of risk, which re-
quired the health exception for both pre- and post-viability abortions. 178
B. CONCURRENCE BY JUSTICE STEVENS, JOINED BY JUSTICE GINSBURG
Justice Stevens began his concurrence by stating that he could not
find how the D&X method of partial birth abortion which Nebraska
sought to ban was any more brutal, gruesome, or less respectful of
"potential life" than the D&E abortion method which the Nebraska
statute allowed. 179 Justice Stevens found it incomprehensible how the
state could have a legitimate interest in potentially requiring a doctor to
go against his best medical judgment by performing an alternate abor-
tion procedure.1 80 Justice Stevens also found no medical difference
between the D&X and D&E abortion procedures and no furtherance of
a legitimate interest by Nebraska in banning D&X and not D&E.181
C. CONCURRENCE BY JUSTICE O'CONNOR
Justice O'Connor analyzed the health exception found in the
Nebraska statute. 182  The Nebraska statute only excepted procedures
which were "necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is
endangered by a physical disorder."18 3 This provision did not include
all situations where the mother's life may be endangered, and Justice
O'Connor concluded that it did not satisfy the health exception require-
ment and thus rendered the statute unconstitutional. 184
Justice O'Connor stated that the Nebraska statute could be constitu-
tional if it implemented the required health exception and tailored the
statutory language to explicitly exclude the D&E procedure from the
176. Id at 935-36.
177. Id. at 937 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)).
178. Id. at 937-38.
179. Id. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding both D&E and D&X partial birth abortion pro-
cedures to be equally gruesome).
180. Id. at 946-47.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 947 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
183. Id.; see also Na. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(1) (Supp. 2000).
184. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 947-48 (2000).
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partial birth abortion ban. 185 Three states currently include language
explicitly excluding the D&E procedure from the respective partial birth
abortion bans: Kansas, Utah, and Montana.186 Justice O'Connor dis-
cussed that a ban on D&X alone would likely not amount to an "undue
burden" on the woman's decision of whether to obtain an abortion.18 7
D. CONCURRENCE BY JUSTICE GINSBURG, JOINED BY JUSTICE STEVENS
Justice Ginsburg observed that the Nebraska statute did not prevent
any fetus from being destroyed, it simply regulated the method by which
the fetus can and cannot be destroyed.188 The statute also did not seek
to protect the lives or health of pregnant women. 189 Justice Ginsburg
agreed with Judge Posner's dissent in Hope Clinic v. Ryan,190 that the
law did not prohibit the D&X procedure because it kills the fetus, nor
because of its risks, nor because of its repulsive nature. 191 Instead, Judge
Posner concluded that the Wisconsin law in Hope Clinic banned D&X
because state legislators sought to chip away at the private choice shield-
ed by Roe and Casey.192 Justice Ginsburg, by agreeing with Judge
Posner, implied that Nebraska in this case enacted the partial birth
abortion ban to prevent women from obtaining abortions altogether.193
185. Id. at 950.
186. Id.; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6721(b)(2)(C) (Supp. 2000). The Kansas ban does not
apply to "[d]ilation and evacuation abortion procedures involving dismemberment of the fetus prior to
removal from the body of the pregnant woman." Id. See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5(1)(a)
(1999). The partial birth prohibition "does not include the dilation and evacuation procedure involving
dismemberment prior to removal." Id. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-401(3)(c)(ii) (1999).
Montana defines the banned partial birth abortion procedure as when
(A) the living fetus is removed intact from the uterus until only the head remains in the
uterus;
(B) all or a part of the intracranial contents of the fetus are evacuated;
(C) the head of the fetus is compressed; and
(D) following fetal demise, the fetus is removed from the birth canal.
Id.
187. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 951.
188. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
189. Id.
190. 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1997).
191. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 951-52; Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 880-82 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Posner, J., dissenting).
192. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 952 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) and




E. DISSENT BY JUSTICE SCALIA
Justice Scalia found that a ban on the D&X procedure with the
required health exception would only give the abortionist ultimate
control over application of the D&X procedure. 194 The only thing
inhibiting the abortionist's decision to proceed would be self-assurance
in his medical judgment that the D&X procedure will most effectively
protect the mother's health.195 Justice Scalia also stated that his defini-
tion of "undue burden" differed from the joint opinion's definition of
"undue burden" found in Casey.196 He described the determination of
what constitutes an undue burden as a value judgment depending on
respect: whether one believed more in respecting the life of the partially
delivered fetus or respecting the freedom of the mother to kill it.197
Justice Scalia stated that the Court should leave the ultimate decision
regarding not just partial birth abortion, but all types of abortion, to the
people by allowing the state legislatures to decide whether or not to
permit abortions within their respective state boundaries. 198 Justice
Scalia reiterated his sentiment from his dissent in Casey when he stated
"Casey must be overruled." 199 Justice Scalia noted the Casey joint
opinion's expressed belief that "Roe v. Wade had 'called the contend-
ing sides of a national controversy to end their national division by
accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution."' 200 Justice
Scalia repeated his reaction to the joint opinion from his dissent in Casey
by stating "Roe fanned into life an issue that has inflamed our national
politics in general, and has obscured with its smoke the selection of
Justices to this Court in particular, ever since." 201
F. DISSENT BY JUSTICE KENNEDY, JOINED BY CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST
Justice Kennedy viewed the issue in this case not as whether the
Court could see a difference between the D&E and D&X abortion
procedures, but whether Nebraska could differentiate between them. 202
The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons distinguished
194. Id. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 954-55; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
197. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 954-55. Justice Scalia stated that in determining whether or not an un-
due burden exists, the conclusion cannot be proven true or false by factual inquiry or legal reasoning.
Id.
198. Id. at 955.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 956 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 867 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973))).
201. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 995-96).
202. Id at 962 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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D&X from D&E because in the D&X procedure, the fetus is "killed
outside of the womb" where the fetus at this point becomes separated
from the mother's control over her own body. 203 This difference to
Justice Kennedy put D&X more akin to infanticide and substantiated
Nebraska's concerns that D&X presented a greater risk of disrespect for
life and disrespect for the medical profession.204
Justice Kennedy found that Nebraska's lack of a statutory health
requirement essentially gave the abortionist, specifically Dr. Carhart, a
"veto power over the state's judgment" against the D&X procedure
because Dr. Carhart performed the D&X procedure in all cases after the
fifteenth week of pregnancy. 205 Because Justice Kennedy found slight
differences in physical safety between the D&E and D&X procedures, he
found that Casey allowed a state to take into account grave moral issues
presented by the abortion method and to regulate abortions according-
ly.206 Justice Kennedy did not accept expert medical opinions citing
situations in which D&X is the only option to protect the mother's life
because none of the experts called to testify by Dr. Carhart had ever
actually performed a partial birth abortion. 207
Justice Kennedy found the majority's decision to be a regression
toward pre- Casey cases such as Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc. ,208 which held that a law requiring a physician to provide a
woman seeking an abortion with an informed decision infringed on the
physician's discretion to practice medicine in accordance with his or her
own medical judgment. 209 Casey involved a similar provision requiring
informed consent, and the joint opinion in Casey held that Akron was
wrong when it invalidated the informed consent law because a physician
who practices abortion, just like any other physician, is subject to state
regulation. 210
Justice Kennedy also disagreed with the majority's interpretations
of the Nebraska statute's terminology. 211 Justice Kennedy construed the
statute to ban only D&X because of its use of the words "deliver" and
"delivery" and the meaning of delivery as the birthing of an intact
203. Id. at 962-63.
204. Id. at 963.
205. Id. at 964-65.
206. Id. at 966-67. Justice Kennedy found the "significant health threat" standard unsatisfied in
this case. Id. at 967; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 880 (requiring the regulation to impose a "significant
[health] threat to the life or health of a woman").
207. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 964 (2000).
208. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
209. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 968-69; see also Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462
U.S. 416, 442-45 (1983).
210. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 969; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 884-85; Akron, 462 U.S. at 448-50.
211. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 973.
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fetus. 2 12 The statute defined partial birth abortion as when the abortion-
ist "partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the
unborn child and completing the delivery." 213 No party argued that a
dismembered fetus qualifies under the term "delivery;" instead only an
intact fetus can be "delivered" in compliance with Nebraska statutory
language. 214
In further analyzing Nebraska's statutory language, Justice Ken-
nedy found the requirement that the fetus be partially delivered into the
vagina "before" the abortionist kills it to be naturally understood to
require two steps in the procedure causing fetal death.2 15 First, the fetus
must be partially delivered into the vagina, and second, the abortionist
must kill it.216 The D&E procedure combines these two steps because
the procedure, which brings the fetus into the vagina, is also the process
of dismemberment, which kills the fetus. 2 17 Because of this understand-
ing, Justice Kennedy interpreted the statute to exclude D&E from the
ban.2 18
Finally, Justice Kennedy noted that the Nebraska Attorney General
was given the opportunity to interpret the statute too late and his inter-
pretation was given too little weight.219 The district court granted an
injunction before the law was even applied, which denied the State
Legislature and the Attorney General the opportunity to interpret the
statute. 220 The majority in this case chose not to recognize the Attorney
General's interpretation of the statutory language.221
G. DISSENT BY JUSTICE THOMAS, JOINED BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
JUSTICE SCALIA
Justice Thomas examined the statutory language of Nebraska's ban
and determined that the law did not include the D&E procedure. 222 Like
Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas focused on the statute's use of the
212. Id. at 973-74.
213. Id. at 973; see also NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-326(9) (Supp. 2000).
214. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 974. Justice Kennedy noted that the United States in its amicus brief
did not use the word "delivery" in reference to D&E, but instead substituted "emerges." Id. at 975.
He also noted the majority used the words "physician pulling" a portion of the fetus rather than "physi-
cian delivering" a portion of the fetus. Id. This he interpreted to support his contention that only the
D&X procedure was banned because of the statutory ban of a procedure involving a "delivery." Id.
215. Id
216. Id.
217. Id. at 975-76.
218. Id. at 976.
219. Id. at 977.
220. Id. at 978-79.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 989 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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words "deliver" and "delivery." 223  He concluded that the statutory
language could not be construed to include the D&E procedure of fetal
dismemberment because limbs cannot be "delivered"; only an intact
fetus can be delivered. 224 He agreed with Justice Kennedy in finding
that the statute's language separated the process of killing the fetus from
the process of delivering it.225 Justice Thomas found D&E to be ex-
cluded from the ban because dismemberment is the process which both
pulled the fetus into the vagina and killed the fetus. 226
Justice Thomas took his analysis of the statute's plain meaning
beyond the majority's.227 He found that ordinary rules of statutory inter-
pretation required ambiguity to be resolved by examining the common
understanding of the term. 228 The majority construed the common
meaning of "partial birth abortion" to include the D&E procedure. 229
Justice Thomas examined what the common meaning of "partial
birth abortion" was in other American arenas. 230 He found support
equating "partial birth abortion" with D&X in the medical community
because the American Medical Association, 2 3 1 other physicians, 2 32 and
one of Dr. Carhart's own medical experts2 3 3 acknowledged that the
phrase "partial birth abortion" is associated with the D&X procedure
and not the D&E procedure. 234 The district court in this case as well as
other lower courts recognized that "partial birth abortion" is commonly
understood to mean D&X.235
223. Id. at 990.
224. Id. at 990-91; see also WEBsTER's THiRDNEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 597 (1993) (defin-
ing deliver as: "to assist in giving birth; to aid in the birth of'); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICIONARY 453
(26th ed. 1995) (defining deliver as: "[t]o assist a woman in childbirth"); OXFoRD ENGUSH DICTIONARY
422 (2d ed. 1989) (defining deliver as: "[t]o disburden of the foetus, to bring to childbirth"); B.
MALOY, MEDICAL DICnONARY FOR LAWYERS 221 (2d ed. 1989) (defining deliver as: "[t]o aid in the
process of childbirth; to bring forth; to deliver the fetus, placenta").
225. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 991-92 (2000).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 992.
228. Id. at 992-93.
229. Id. at 939.
230. Id. at 993.
231. Id. at 993 (citing AMA Board of Trustees Factsheet on H.R. 1122 (June 1997) (finding the
D&X procedure different from other abortion procedures because in D&X the fetus is killed outside
the womb)).
232. Id.; see also Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 44 F. Supp. 2d 975,999 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (citing
testimony); Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, 55 F. Supp. 2d 441, 455 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(citing testimony).
233. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 994 (2000) (finding expert Dr. Phillip Stubblefield
testified that the press refers to the D&X procedure as "partial birth abortion").
234. Id.
235. See Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1121, n.26 (D. Neb. 1998) (finding that partial
birth abortions are known as intact dilation and extraction or D&X); see also Little Rock Family
Planning Services v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 795 (8th Cir. 1999); Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa,
Inc. v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386, 387 (8th Cir. 1999).
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Finally, Justice Thomas looked to legislation using the term "partial
birth abortion." 236 Congress used the term twice when it drafted legis-
lation aimed at banning "partial birth abortions." 237 Hearings and
debates conducted regarding these bans repeatedly separate the term
"partial birth abortion" from the D&E procedure. 238 Two states out of
thirty, Ohio239 and Missouri, 240 chose not to refer to the banned proce-
dure as "partial birth abortion." 241
Reasoning that the majority and Justice O'Connor evaded constru-
ing the statute, Justice Thomas discussed the Court's responsibility to
consider "whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible that
would avoid the constitutional question." 242 The Nebraska Legislature
had traditionally shouldered the responsibility of defining medical terms
that carried legal significance, and those definitions were generally not
required to be identical to medical definitions.243
Justice Thomas found that both the majority and Justice O'Connor
expanded on the principles set forth in Roe and Casey.244 Casey held
that a health exception is required "if 'continuing her pregnancy would
constitute a threat' to the woman." 245 Neither Roe nor Casey discussed
circumstances in which a physician considered a banned abortion
procedure to be more preferable to legal abortion procedures, as in this
case. 246 Justice Thomas faulted the majority and Justice O'Connor for
not distinguishing between situations where health concerns require a
pregnant woman to obtain an abortion and situations where health
concerns cause her to prefer a particular method of abortion. 247
Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority's assessment of the
Casey standard questioned by this case. 248 He stated the real Casey
236. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 994.
237. Id. Congressional legislation prohibiting partial birth abortions was introduced in the Partial
Birth Abortion Ban Act, H.R. 1833, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) and Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of
1997, H.R. 1122, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). Id. at 994 n.1 1. Both pieces of legislation passed both
Congressional houses by wide margins but were vetoed by President Clinton. Id. Both times the House
voted to override the veto but the Senate fell short of overriding the veto, which killed the legislation.
Id.
238. Id.
239. OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15(A) (Anderson 1999). The Ohio ban refers to the banned
procedure simply as "dilation and extraction." Id.
240. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 563.300 (Vernon Supp. 2001). The Missouri ban refers to the banned
procedure as "infanticide," defined as killing a partially born infant. Id.
241. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 995 n.ll.
242. Id. at 996.
243. Id. at 999 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997)).
244. Id. at 1009 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) and Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)).
245. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 880).
246. Id. at 1010.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1013 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 877).
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question was whether prohibiting a partial birth abortion without a health
exception posed a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion.249
Justice Thomas concluded that it did not for two reasons: because the
Court did not identify a real or substantial barrier to obtaining an
abortion and because the Court could not demonstrate that such an
obstacle would affect a sufficient number of women to justify invalidat-
ing the statute on its face.250
Justice Thomas relied on physician testimony that claimed there
were no circumstances in which D&X was the only abortion procedure
to save the mother's life.251 This testimony was supported by the Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Executive Board.252 He
also relied on testimony presented to the Nebraska legislature of
evidence of increased health risks arising from the D&X procedure. 253
Justice Thomas asserted that because Stenberg was a facial challenge to
the Nebraska statute, the operative test should be whether there was a
"large fraction" of women seeking to obtain a partial birth abortion
who would face a substantial obstacle in their path toward obtaining a
safe abortion because of their inability to use the D&X procedure. 254
Justice Thomas found this standard easily satisfied because of the small
number of women who obtained an abortion after sixteen weeks of
pregnancy as well as the alternative D&E procedure's availability. 255
IV. IMPACT
Stenberg v. Carhart has caused a ripple effect across the nation's
sea of abortion legislation and abortion debate, which has been anything
but tranquil in the wake of Roe and Casey. Since Stenberg was decided
on June 28, 2000, several state partial birth abortion bans have been
struck down as unconstitutional by courts. 256 Currently, eighteen states'
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1015.
252. Id.
253. Id
254. Id. at 1019-20.
255. Id.
256. See Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, 220 F. 3d 127, 153 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:65A-6(e) (West 2000) unconstitutional because it placed an undue burden on women seek-
ing abortions by banning D&E as well as D&X and because it had no health exception for women);
Richmond Med. Ctr. For Women v. Gilmore, 224 F.3d 337, 339 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18-2-74.2 (Michie Supp. 2001) unconstitutional because it was "indistinguishable" from the Ne-
braska statute found unconstitutional in Stenberg); Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 221 F.3d 811, 812
(5th Cir. 2000) (finding LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.9 (West Supp. 2001) unconstitutional in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg); Eubanks v. Stengel, 224 F.3d 576, 576 (6th Cir. 2000) (find-
ing Kentucky partial birth abortion ban unconstitutional because it dealt with similar issues addressed
in Stenberg); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386, 389 (8th Cir. 1999) cert. denied, 530 U.S.
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"partial birth" abortion bans are permanently blocked by court action
taken either prior to or subsequent to Stenberg.257 In ten states, "partial
birth" abortion bans have never been litigated but are not considered
enforceable after Stenberg.258 Three states' "partial birth" abortion
bans were limitedly enforced prior to Stenberg and now may no longer
be enforceable. 259
Justice O'Connor's concurrence has left state legislators as well as
some of the dissenters to wrestle with the question as to the constitu-
tionality of a partial birth abortion ban which explicitly excludes the
D&X procedure and includes a health exception for the life of the
mother. 260 Justice O'Connor stated that the Kansas, Montana and Utah
statutes, which explicitly exclude the D&E procedure from the ban, were
constitutional under the standards set forth in Stenberg.261 Justice
Thomas' dissent discredited Justice O'Connor's assurance that laws simi-
lar to Nebraska's which were unconstitutional could be easily remedied
by adding a health exception and excluding D&E.262 So far, there has
not been a challenge to a partial birth abortion ban which has addressed
either of these issues. 263
Neither of North Dakota's two abortion clinics practiced either the
D&E or the controversial D&X procedure. 264 Jane Bovard, administra-
tor of the Red River Women's Clinic in Fargo, North Dakota, and Kim
Horab, administrator of the Fargo Women's Health Organization Clinic,
have said that even prior to the ban, the partial birth abortion procedure
was not performed at either clinic. 265 The Fargo Women's Health
Organization Clinic has since closed, but since both clinics performed
1274 (2000) (enjoining permanently IowA CODE § 707.8A(2) (Supp. 2001) as unconstitutional because
it imposed an undue burden on a woman seeking to obtain an abortion because it banned the D&E
method as well as the D&X method); Daniel v. Underwood, 102 F. Supp. 2d 680, 686 (S.D. W.Va.
2000) (finding W. VA. CODE §§ 33-42-3(3)-(5) & 33-42-8 (2000) unconstitutional because they im-
posed an undue burden by banning both D&E and D&X and because they contained no health
exception for the woman).
257. See The Status of Major Abortion-Related Laws and Policies in the States, May 31, 2001, The
Alan Guttmacher Institute, at http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/abort_law_status.html (last visited July 31,
2001) (listing: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, minois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michi-
gan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
258. Id. (listing: Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah).
259. Id. (listing: Alabama, Georgia, and Montana).
260. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 951 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra
Part III.E-G (discussing the dissenting opinions of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas).
261. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 950 (listing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6721(b) (Supp. 2000); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5(1)(a) (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-401(3)(c)(ii) (1999)).
262. Id. at 1013 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
263. See Pat Wingert, The Next Abortion Battle, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 2000, at 24. Nebraska pro-
life groups claim they will not support a rewrite of the unconstitutional statute excluding D&E and
including a health exception for the mother. Id.
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abortions only through the sixteenth week of pregnancy, women seeking
abortions after this stage are referred to abortion clinics in other states. 266
There are no records kept by the State Health Department as to whether
the partial birth abortion procedure was performed in North Dakota
hospitals before the ban took effect. 267
North Dakota's law is "materially distinct from Nebraska," accord-
ing to Doug Barh, North Dakota Solicitor General.268 North Dakota's
partial birth abortion ban defines "partially born" as "(a) the living
intact fetus's entire head ... or any portion of the living intact fetus's
torso above the navel, in the case of a breech presentation, is delivered
past the mother's vaginal opening; or (b) . . . delivered outside the
mother's abdominal wall." 269 This definition clears up some disagree-
ment between the majority and the dissenters in Stenberg as to the
interpretation of Nebraska's statutory use of "deliver" and "delivery"
because it defines what portions of a fetus have to be delivered to qualify
as a partial birth abortion. 270 North Dakota's law is similar to Ne-
braska's in the aspect that neither allows a physician to use partial birth
abortion even if his or her medical judgment finds the procedure most
appropriate. 271 North Dakota's law differs from Nebraska's however,
because North Dakota's exception for situations in which the mother's
life is in jeopardy is more comprehensive than Nebraska's.272
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court invalidated a Nebraska statute that banned
partial birth abortions on the grounds that the statute placed an undue
burden on a woman seeking to obtain a partial birth abortion.273 The
Court found the Nebraska partial birth abortion ban unconstitutional for
266. Id.; see also One of Fargo's Two Abortion-Performing Clinics Closes, STAR TRmuNE, Feb. 2,
2001, at 3B.
267. See Nicholson, supra note 264.
268. Id.
269. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.6-01 (Supp. 1999).
270. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942-43, 973 (2000).
271. See Nicholson, supra note 264.
272. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.6-03 (Supp. 1999). Section 14-02.6-03 states:
Exception for the life of mother. Section 14-02.6-02 does not prohibit a physician from
taking measures that in the physician's medical judgment are necessary to save the life
of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, illness, or injury, if:
1. Every reasonable precaution is also taken, in this case, to save the child's life; and
2. The physician first certifies in writing, setting forth in detail the facts upon
which the physician relies in making this judgment. This certification is not
required in the case of an emergency and the procedure is necessary to
preserve the life of the mother.
273. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930.
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two reasons: (1) because the statute imposed an "undue burden" on a
woman's ability to choose a D&E abortion, which unduly burdened her
right to choose abortion itself, and (2) because the statute lacked any
exception for protection of the mother's health. 274
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